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Introduction 
The most common approach to explain a navy’s role in strategy is by using sea power theory. 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, many naval thinkers developed similarly minded 
approaches to thinking about the broad roles and functions of navies (Hattendorf, 2013, p. 5). Naval 
theorists like Corbett and Mahan provide us with theories for explaining sea power and its strategic 
role, use and purpose. Taken together, their theories offer a wealth of information and knowledge on 
various aspects of naval warfare. For better or for worse, naval classical thinkers influenced 
generations of practitioners and theoreticians. A navy’s culture, the way it wages war, and doctrine 
cannot be fully understood without a thorough understanding of the ideas of the great and lesser 
naval thinkers (Vego, 2009, p. 16). Unfortunately, these theories all have their origins in syntheses of 
historical events. Naval history constitutes the experience and practice that one uses to verify sea 
power theories. In effect, sea power theory therefore has an empirical basis but no scientific 
verification. Their scope, that is, under what conditions and when they apply, remains scientifically 
unverified (Berndt Brehmer in: Kristiansen & Olsen, 2007, p. 35). One must therefore question 
whether these theories are normative. Obviously, sea power theory is strategic thinking, but theory 
developed for a specific context and a specific public. Mahan and Corbett’s theories do appear and 
are generally accepted as general theories – but only from a great power and open sea perspective 
(Till, 2004, pp. 28-29). Thus, Mahan and Corbett’s theories, and other sea power theories, do not 
cover properly the role of small navies in general and the Norwegian navy in particular, within 
contemporary naval strategy and application of maritime power. Moreover, a common assumption 
in naval thinking is that a lesser sea power has to compete symmetrically with its stronger opponent 
in order to accomplish their goals (John B. Hattendorf in: Hobson & Kristiansen, 2004, pp. 151-152; 
Holmes, 2012). That is a dangerous and erroneous idea. Small navies have distinctive purposes, 
functions and characteristics in and of their own. As a small nation, Norway’s military-strategic aims 
are limited and distinct, allowing tailor-made naval forces for definite strategic circumstances and 
aims. Such forces cannot be good at everything nor can they challenge a superior sea power 
symmetrically. They can, however, prevent a greater power from accomplishing its goals through 
focusing on specific tasks and objectives, and by utilising the inherent advantages our limited 
strategic scope and geography provide, they can do this with great effect. 
Even if these theories do not explain or clarify the strategic role of a small navy, they do nevertheless 
provide us with a language and a strategic framework usable for explaining and clarifying this role. 
In my presentation, I will explore and explain the Norwegian Navy’s strategic role as a tailor-made 
navy for our specific strategic environment and strategic requirements; hereunder the balancing act 
between existential military-strategic requirements, i.e. defence of Norway, and other maritime and 
security interests which the Norwegian Navy has to handle. 
Defining strategy 
Strategy is about getting more out of a situation than what the balance of power would indicate; it is 
the art of creating power. Strategy therefore has to be seen as the art and science of using military 
force to achieve political goals through the use of or threat of violence (Lykke Jr., 1997, p. 183) . 
According to Corbett, the strategic role or roles of the Navy are determined by what part the fleet 
must play in relation to the action of the land forces; it scarcely needs saying that it is almost 
impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone (Corbett, 1911:2004, p. 13). An ideal 
maritime strategy is thus fully complementary to the national military strategy, and describes how 
naval forces can make a strategic difference (Barnett, 2007, p. 32). However, to understand what this 
role is one must look at strategy as what connects strategic purposes and strategic conditions, where 
purposes are what one wants to achieve, while strategic conditions are those facts that frame our 
strategic options. Strategic conditions are nothing but the sum of strategic dimensions such as 
national policies, foreign politics, command and control, geography, financing, logistics, preparations 
(administrative, recruiting, training and structure), operations, technology, information and 
intelligence, the enemy, friction, uncertainty and time (Gray, 1999, pp. 23-44; Howard, 1979, pp. 
975-986. The list is not exhaustive). Amongst these, geography takes precedence as it defines, 
influences, and delimits most other dimensions. Yet, before looking into our geostrategic position, 
we must take an overview of our strategic interests. 
Norwegian maritime interest beyond national defence 
Norwegian maritime interests are far from limited to the territorial defence of Norway. Norway’s 
economy is one of the most open and internationally orientated economies in the world. For 
instance, maritime industries, that is oil and gas, shipping incl. financing, classing and insurance, 
yards and equipment, fisheries and aqua farming, collectively contribute to 31% of Norway’s national 
outcome by kind of main activity ("Annual national accounts, 2016," 2016). Furthermore, ships or 
subsea pipelines carry 80-90% of Norwegian export and import. Such numbers by themselves 
illustrate that the Norwegian economy is heavily dependent on a stable world order with set 
regulations for conduct of business. Any major changes in how the world works, e.g. the conduct of 
international trade and business, could cause catastrophic economic consequences for Norway. 
Hence, international law and order, and the maintenance of a world order akin to the existing is 
crucial for Norway. Norway does and will continue to promote, improve and secure the existing 
world order by all available means; hereunder strictly adhere to the United Nations Convention on 
Law of the Sea, UNCLOS. Although our military forces are insignificant compared to major powers, 
we do involve ourselves in conflicts all around the world to promote our interests, but mostly as part 
of coalitions or by other means than military ones. Such involvement comes in many forms but sea 
power is and remains one of the most tangible and cost effective tools we have. 
At the same time Norway, as a small although wealthy state with far-flung interest, cannot, in any 
foreseeable situation, build and maintain naval forces that can effectively shield, protect or sustain 
our maritime interests by ourselves beyond our own waters. Norway is therefore dependent on 
allied support or of being part of a broad international coalition with the same objectives in support 
of the existing world order. Being part of an alliance or coalition means that you have to contribute; 
one cannot base allied support on goodwill and common interest alone, and definitely not if one 
expects our views and interests to be taken into account when actions are decided.  
The Norwegian navy also has a large number of tasks and missions in a national context, as detailed 
below. Tailor-made forces are the most effective way to accomplish these purely national tasks. 
However, such forces have characteristics and capacities that do not necessarily match the 
requirements of international or overseas operations. On the other hand, if we focus our structure 
towards international requirements, we will end up with a navy that is poorly suited, or at least 
ineffective, for our own existential defence. In addition, Norway have huge economic interests and 
obligations in our economic zones and on the continental shelf. Our Coast Guard upholds our 
sovereign rights, national authority and partly delivers SAR capacities in these waters. The Coast 
Guard is part of the navy, but still distinctly different concerning both missions and force structure. 
Our navy’s strategic role or roles, and hence force composition and operational capabilities, are thus 
a precarious multifaceted balancing act – a dilemma. This dilemma, this balancing act between our 
capabilities to influence developments globally, maintain our sovereign rights, and fulfil our 
defensive requirements, is not new. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, where Norway suffered 
famine and economic collapse because of blockade by the dominant sea power, Norway has always 
aimed at being neutral towards or allied to the greatest sea power in our region. If we end up on the 
wrong side, i.e. lose control of the maritime domain, we could be defeated as a sovereign state 
regardless of developments ashore in Norway proper. Our economy would collapse, our people 
starve, and our political freedom would become severely restricted or quickly coerced into 
submission. However, as 1940 showed, if our navy is incapable of denying an enemy access to our 
strategic heartland, then being on the right side does not help.  
Norwegian military geography - inside out 
The meaning of the very name of Norway largely explains our navy’s strategic role in a national 
setting. “Norway” means the fairway to the north. Norway is not a continuous piece of territory, but 
numerous small and scattered settlements along 100,915 km of coastline (2,500 km baseline) and 
239,057 islands. Land communications are likewise few and concentrated near the coast, and in 
many instances dependent on ferries to cross fjords. In fact, much of Norway's long land frontier and 
territory is mostly impassable for large military units. However, if one sees our seaboard as a 
'frontier', it becomes glaringly obvious that Norway has an extremely unfavourable ratio of 
circumference to area. A strong maritime power is therefore our most dangerous opponent, as it 
would master the approaches to our longest frontier. 
Nations like the French and Russians can abandon their peripheries and fall back into the heart of 
their countries. This Norway cannot do as the bulk of our population lives along the three-thousand-
kilometre coastline. Moreover, almost all the towns and practically the entire economic base is 
located here as well. The hinterland, on the other hand, is mostly mountains and forest. 
Geostrategically, Norway is inside out. The seaboard is not the country's outer shell but its living 
heart. A sea power can assault this long, exposed heart wherever it wishes. Within Norwegian 
territory, moreover, the sea does not divide, but links together, so that a maritime invader can 
outflank any landbound defender (Pugh, 1984, pp. 99-100). 
 
 
Figure 1: Part of Troms County. This map is illustrative for Norway’s geographical configuration. 
Geostrategic position 
The strategy for a small state with an overall defensive or status-quo approach in their relationship 
with other states is to a very large degree determined by others’ interest in our territory, airspace 
and waters, and not so much our own ambitions beyond our national strategic aims, which are to 
secure our sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action. It is therefore Norway’s 
absolute and relative geographic position in relation to major powers and our strategic resources 
that determine whether, with what, and to what degree other states might use military power 
against us. 
Today Russia is the only state that constitutes a major military threat to Norway’s existential political-
aims, although others like the US and many European states also have a vital interest in whom 
controls Norway. Controlling the Norwegian territory and the waters of Norway provides ability to 
threaten both Western and Russian strategic centres of gravity. Foremost amongst these are Russia’s 
nuclear deterrence in the form of strategic submarines and their second-strike or retaliation 
capability (60% of which is based in the Northern Fleet). In any conflict between Russia and 
NATO/USA these submarines constitute the key arbitrator for Russia. The Russian strategic 
deterrence concept is not only a matter of preventing use of force but also aims at limiting the 
potential for use of force against Russia. It combines deterrence and coercive actions in one package. 
Russian strategic deterrence does not end with war but works continuously also in war. Nuclear 
deterrence capabilities, and especially their strategic submarines, ensure that Russia always 
maintains an ability to prevent unwanted escalation, secures an ability to deescalate, and can be 
used to enforce an abrupt end to warfighting when Russia requires. This fact also means that Russia 
is likely to take preventive action to secure their strategic submarines and associated infrastructure 
before a conflict renders offensive action against these key Russian assets likely. They will set their 
so-called Bastion defence whenever they view an armed conflict with NATO as likely or if it has 
already erupted.  This also means that NATO does not deter Russia from establishing and extending 
their Bastion, NATO causes it. 
Norwegian territory, our infrastructure, and the seas off our coasts are essential if Russia are to 
maintain their submarine based nuclear deterrence. Therefore, offensive action against Norway 
remains likely before a full-scale conflict erupts and regardless of whether the origin of the conflict is 
in our region or not. 
Russia’s concept for strategic deterrence is furthermore universal and includes coercive means in 
order to minimize threats against Russian interests, meaning Russia will use every available tool to 
promote the strategic aims. In shaping their security environment they will thus utilise means such as 
economic and information operations (Mastriano, 2017, pp. 14-15). However, it is only within one 
economic domain that Russia holds tools that could influence or coerce the West. That is energy 
supply. Through incentives and extortion, they can pressure other states into compliance, and Russia 
has used energy supply as a weapon before. Nonetheless, energy warfare is a tool which could 
backfire (Mastriano, 2017, p. 15). It is therefore likely that Russia will show restraint and only use 
such a tool if it is overwhelmingly likely to be effective. 
In 2013, the EU imported about 161.5 Gm3 of natural gas from Russia; i.e. approximately 30% of 
Europe’s gas consumption. Beyond Russia Norway, 106.6 Gm3, and Algeria, 32.8 Gm3, were the two 
other major suppliers of gas to Europe (2012 numbers). Norway, Algeria, Azerbaijan and Iran can 
potentially increase their delivery of gas by 40% (ca. 65 Gm3) (CIEP, 2014). Replacing Russian gas fully 
is only possible if one supplements such an increase by Liquid Natural Gas delivered by shipping. That 
would increase cost, but simultaneously reduce energy warfare to a rather inefficient tool. It would 
be wholly another matter if Russia could control Norwegian gas export as well. Closing off both 
Norwegian and Russian gas would leave Europe dark and cold. Thus, Norwegian gas production is of 
vital interest for not only Norway, but also for the EU, including the UK and Russia, and does render 
Russian use of military power against Norway plausible regardless of whether there is a bilateral or 
regional conflict between Norway and Russia or not. 
Furthermore, both the Bastion defence scenario and the energy scenario could happen in 
circumstances when NATO’s most capable rapid response forces are already fully occupied, or when 
NATO, or some NATO members, are unwilling to risk escalation and full-scale conflict.  Rapid and 
ample response and support from NATO would or could therefore be unlikely. To a large degree, 
Norway must therefore be able to handle such situations by ourselves, i.e. unsupported and against 
potentially overwhelming odds. 
Operational factors that determine strategic approach 
Beyond the above listed geographic and geostrategic factors, one must also consider operational and 
technological approaches Russia uses in its strategic concepts. This paper does not leave room for an 
extensive exploration of such operational concepts, but one ought nevertheless to consider that 
Russia would likely hold initial escalation dominance in every conflict involving Norway. Russia 
therefore would determine what means they employ, when, and where.  
In any war with limited strategic aims, which a war between nuclear powers mostly likely would be, 
the establishment of a fait accompli takes precedence. To attack efficiently first has always been 
important, but as our resources and units today are very limited and impossible to replace in the 
short-term, a coup de grâce has become all the more achievable.  Furthermore, it is entirely 
inconceivable that Norway could attack effectively first unless warfighting already has erupted. 
Therefore, Norway suffers a double strategic challenge. We may be subject to a hybrid warfare 
approach that gradually reduces our will and ability to defend ourselves and must simultaneously be 
able to meet a full-scale and comprehensive strategic surprise attack in all domains. 
Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and concepts, which are key in their defensive 
approach for securing their Bastion, cause three further major challenges for Norway. Firstly, our 
forces must be able to survive and fight within a Russian denial area. In open waters that is only 
possible for submarines and other hidden means such as naval mines. Such means are effective in 
the long-term, but against a single operation, they depend on being in the right place at the right 
time as they lack tactical mobility and are thus fairly easy to outmanoeuvre for an opponent that 
determines time and space. We must therefore also utilise our geography, i.e. our littorals, as a force 
multiplier, i.e. operate and hide amongst thousands of islands, utilising radar shadows and 
challenging navigational conditions to our advantage. Only by supplementing our submarines with 
highly mobile units that can hide amongst islets and in fjords and be able to deliver long-range 
precision attacks into open waters may we sustain sea denial for any substantial time cost-effectively 
Secondly, a Russian push to extend their A2/AD zone would require access to Norwegian territory. 
Only maritime power projection into our littorals renders that possible. If they are already in place, 
having achieved a fait accompli, they will turn our geographic advantage against us. It is therefore 
key to eliminate before they arrive inshore. Thirdly, due to the combination of long-range precision 
strikes, few and vulnerable landlines of communications, a likely unfavourable air situation, and 
Russian open-water sea denial capabilities, we must maintain sea control in our inshore fairways if 
we are to have mobility and logistic support. If we cannot protect these waters, we cannot receive 
landbound reinforcements, move them or own forces, nor secure or resupply them at an acceptable 
risk. 
To defend Norway at sea and from the sea therefore requires very specific and specialised forces, but 
also forces that complement each other. We cannot fulfil our strategic role without the capacity to 
conduct open water and inshore sea denial. We cannot respond to attacks or sustain own forces and 
population without the capacity to ensure sea control in our inshore waters, and finally, we cannot 
receive, stage and utilise allied reinforcements without securing their access to Norwegian waters 
and sustainment and mobility for these after they have arrived. 
Conclusions 
The strategic power potential constituted by maritime power projection is highly dependent on 
geostrategic context, that is what one aims to achieve and in what geographic context. Therefore, 
against an unreservedly maritime nation such as Norway, maritime power projection constitutes a 
huge, if not decisive, strategic potential. Norway might very well lose a war at sea due to the indirect 
effects loss of maritime communications would cause. Without maritime communications Norway 
would be unable to concentrate, uphold or utilise fighting power when and where required. 
Therefore, our ability to conduct sea control and sea denial operations is essential for Norway. Only 
through sea control, limited in time and space, can we maintain manoeuvrability, mobility and 
sustainment of forces. Only through sea denial can we prevent an enemy from accessing our 
strategic centre of gravity. 
Furthermore, as Norwegian territory, air space and waters are vital to project power towards Russia’s 
military centre of gravity, their strategic submarines, and likewise for Russia to project military power 
against NATO, our grand-strategic aims might very well be undermined or impossible to achieve even 
if naval warfare off our coast does not influence us directly. This means that should our allies’ 
freedom to utilise maritime communications be reduced or lost, it could very well cause strategic 
defeat also for Norway even if we maintain physical control over our territory. Defence of Norway is 
therefore not an isolated affair, nor is Norway only an importer of security. Our ability to influence 
the maritime theatre in support of allied requirements could very well be vital to ensure our strategic 
aims even if we are not the target for strategic offensives ourselves. 
As shown, Norway is a maritime nation through and through both geographically and economically. 
That means that Norway’s strategy has to take into account the sea as a substantial factor in any 
armed conflict. According to Corbett, the strategic role or roles of the Navy is determined by what 
part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces, as, according to him, it scarcely 
needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone (Corbett, 
1911:2004, p. 13). Corbett’s revelations are however not a universal truth – they are only rough 
guidelines applicable in specific conditions. The strategic interests of others do in fact determine the 
kind of war and operations we would have to fight. It could indeed render Corbett’s view on the 
relationship between land and sea power irrelevant or even turn it inside out in some instances. 
As a small nation, Norway’s military-strategic aims are limited and distinct allowing tailor-made naval 
forces. Such forces cannot be good at everything nor can they challenge a superior sea power 
symmetrically. They can however hinder a greater power from accomplishing its goals through 
focusing on specific tasks and objectives. Such tailor-made forces could provide us with significant 
ability to secure our own national survival, support our allies’ overall strategic aims, and make us into 
a relevant partner for the Atlantic powers, i.e. the USA and the EU. Nevertheless, in periods when 
international tasks are abundant and the territorial threat from e.g. Russia is low or at least perceived 
as low, Norway must support our allies and interests when and wherever required – if not, allied 
support and reinforcements would be even less likely than today as we would be seen as a free-rider. 
Therefore, our Navy has evolved and been structured, and will continue to develop, quite differently 
from most other navies in Europe. Norway still maintains a large fleet comparable with most other 
states, but also a navy that is specialised for our particular requirements. For instance, anti-surface 
warfare based on discreet and hidden assets takes precedence; we focus on inshore counter mine 
measures, our ability to protect inshore sea lines of communications, and on assets that can operate 
with almost full tactical impunity also within a Russian denial zone. However, as weapon technology 
evolves with increasing range, lethality and precision, we cannot fight only in the littorals anymore. 
At present, we must be able to project power into the open sea – this gradual but accelerating 
change in strategic realities does in fact cause our navy’s strategic roles to change as well. Traditional 
anti-invasion forces focussing on sea denial in inlets to our fjords is no longer as relevant. Gradually 
we must increase our ability to deny an enemy his operational freedom also in open waters far from 
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